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We consider an incomplete markets economy with capital accumula-
tion and endogenous labor supply. Individuals face countercyclical id-
iosyncratic labor and asset risk. We derive conditions under which the
aggregate allocations and price system can be found by solving a repre-
sentative agent problem. This result is applied to analyze the properties
of an optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian economy with unin-
sured countercyclical individual risk. The optimal monetary policy that
emerges from our incomplete markets economy is the same as the optimal
monetary policy in a representative agent model with preference shocks.
When price rigidity is the only friction the optimal monetary policy calls
for stabilizing the ination rate at zero.
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11 Introduction
This paper establishes an aggregation theorem for a class of incomplete market
economies and uses it to analyze the properties of optimal monetary policy when
markets are incomplete.
Our aggregation result is interesting because it applies to a model that cap-
tures some of the most signicant features of the business cycle. For instance,
in the data over 60% of the total variation in output over the business cycle is
due to variation in labor input. Labor supply is endogenous in our model and
monetary policy can aect labor market conditions.
Another property of the business cycle is that capital accumulation makes
it possible for the entire economy to insure against variations in economic ac-
tivity. The signicance of this mechanism can be easily discerned in aggregate
variability statistics. Aggregate consumption is much less volatile than output
while aggregate investment is much more volatile than output. This mechanism
is operating in our economy. Capital formation is endogenous and monetary
policy can inuence the level of investment.
A nal aspect of the business cycle that we want to model is a positive cor-
relation between uninsured unemployment and asset risk. For most households
their single most important investment is their home.1 In many localities la-
bor market outcomes are related either directly or indirectly to the economic
performance of large employers. When these employers downsize their labor
force this implies both a higher probability of unemployment and also a higher
probability of lower house prices.2 We assume that idiosyncratic labor income
risk is correlated with asset return risk in our model.
Our paper makes contributions to the literature on incomplete markets mod-
els of the business cycle. Producing a tractable real model of the private sector
with endogenous labor supply and endogenous capital formation is a challenge.
In the current literature there are two approaches to modeling the business cycle
with incomplete markets. One approach uses strictly numerical methods. The
advantage of this approach is that one can model both labor supply and capital
formation. Krusell, Mukoyama, Sahin and Smith (2009), consider the welfare
cost of business cycles in a real economy with idiosyncratic, countercyclical la-
bor risk and capital formation and exogenous labor supply. Storesletten, Telmer
and Yaron (2001) model countercyclical risk in a real overlapping generations
model with capital formation and exogenous labor. Chang and Kim (2007) con-
sider labor supply decisions in an innite horizon model with capital formation
but idiosyncratic risk is acyclical.
The principal disadvantage of this approach is the curse of dimensionality. As
the dimension of either the shock space or the list of endogenous state variables is
increased one quickly hits the limits of computational feasibility. For this reason
the above papers only have a single aggregate shock and a single endogenous
1Wol (2010), for instance, reports that in 2007 over 61% of wealth was invested in the
primary residence for the bottom 90% of the U.S. wealth distribution.
2See Foote, Gerardi, Goette and Willen (2010) for empirical evidence on the positive
correlation between unemployment and mortgage default risk.
2aggregate state variable. Deriving optimal state-contingent government policies
creates an additional layer of computational diculty, because these policies
are, in principle, indexed by each possible history.
An alternative strategy is to make assumptions that allow one to derive
closed form or nearly closed form results. Most of this research builds on ideas
rst developed by Constantinides and Due (1996). Heathcote, Storesletten
and Violante (2008) consider the eects of an increase in labor risk in an in-
complete markets economy that admits a closed form solution. However, that
model abstracts from capital formation. Krebs (2003) computes the welfare
cost of business cycles in a model with countercyclical idiosyncratic risk and
capital formation. However, his model abstracts from labor supply. Kruger and
Lustig (2010) derive conditions under which incomplete markets are irrelevant
for the price of aggregate risk. But, their result requires that idiosyncratic risk
be acyclical and they derive their result in an exchange economy.
The real side of the economy we consider extends this previous research by
modeling both labor supply and capital formation jointly. Our specication
of the risk environment assumes that the labor productivity of each individual
follows a geometric random walk, and there are no insurance markets for that
risk. We assume that the return to savings of each individual is also subject to
idiosyncratic risk. Under these assumptions we establish that the no-trade the-
orem of Constantinides and Due (1996) extends to our production economy
with endogenous labor supply. This is accomplished by producing an aggre-
gation result that establishes the existence of a representative-agent economy
with preference shocks that yields the same aggregate quantities and prices in
equilibrium as the original heterogeneous-agents economy with incomplete mar-
kets.3 Our model has the property that an increase in the variance of idiosyn-
cratic income shocks acts to increase (resp. decrease) the discount factor in the
corresponding representative-agent economy if the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of consumption is less (resp. greater) than unity.
Motivated by recent empirical evidence documented in Storesletten, Telmer
and Yaron (2004), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we model countercyclical
variation in idiosyncratic risk. Modeling countercyclical idiosyncratic risk can
produce large welfare costs of business cycles.4 Our model shares this prop-
erty. Lucas' (1987) measure exceeds 12% of consumption when the coecient
of relative risk aversion is two.
We apply our aggregation result to analyze optimal monetary policy when
individuals face uninsured idiosyncratic risk in a New Keynesian model. One
challenge to analyzing optimal monetary policy in such an environment arises
from the fact that Calvo price setting makes prot maximization of each rm an
intertemporal problem. When nancial markets are incomplete, shareholders,
in general, do not agree on how to value future dividends.5 In the context of
3For a general discussion on the correspondence between incomplete-markets economies
and representative-agent economies, see Nakajima (2005).
4See, for instance, Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001), Krebs (2003) and De Santis
(2007).
5For an overview on the theory of incomplete markets, see, for instance, Magill and Quinzii
3the Calvo model, this implies that when a rm obtains an opportunity to adjust
the price of its product, its shareholders do not agree about the price it should
charge. In our setup there is no disagreement problem. All shareholders value
future dividends in the same way.
In this paper we focus on sticky prices, and abstract from sticky wages.
As is well known, complete price stabilization achieves the rst best in the
representative-agent New Keynesian model with sticky prices, provided that the
average distortion due to monopolistic competition among intermediate goods
producers is corrected by a subsidy.6 Using our aggregation result we establish
that price stabilization is also optimal in our incomplete markets model. This
is true in spite of the fact that the welfare cost of business cycles is far larger
than in the standard representative-agent New Keynesian model.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In our model there are two ways
that government policy can improve on laissez faire allocations. One way is
to enhance productive eciency by correcting the dynamic markup and associ-
ated price distortions. The other way is to provide insurance either via direct
redistribution or indirect redistribution. Direct redistribution falls within the
domain of scal policy, and thus we rule out this possibility. Indirect redistribu-
tion involves manipulating the price system in a way that benets households
who experience negative idiosyncratic shocks and thus provides them with im-
plicit insurance. Under the assumption that idiosyncratic shocks to labor and
capital income are perfectly correlated, our aggregation result establishes that
monetary policy has identical eects on all individuals and thus is unable to
provide this type of implicit insurance. It follows that the optimal monetary
policy in our incomplete markets economy is to stabilize the price level when
there is a subsidy to intermediate goods producers that corrects the steady state
distortion.
Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007) have previously found that the optimal
monetary policy obtained in the New Keynesian model with complete markets
continues to call for (nearly) complete price stabilization when there is no sub-
sidy to producers. The representative agent representation of our incomplete
markets model is dierent from the complete markets economy considered in
Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007) in several respects. We have preference dis-
count shocks that are correlated with the aggregate state of technology and they
don't. The welfare costs of business cycles are also large in our model but small
in theirs. It turns out that these dierences are innocuous. Complete stabi-
lization of the price level is a nearly optimal monetary policy in our incomplete
markets model too.
These results on the irrelevance of incomplete markets for optimal monetary
policy are robust to the source of price rigidity. In the Appendix we consider
a setting with both costly price and wage adjustment. This second nominal
rigidity creates a tradeo between price stabilization, on the one hand, and wage
stabilization on the other hand and price stabilization.7 Our result applies in
(1996).
6See, for instance, Woodford (2003) or Gal  (2008).
7See Gal  (2008) for further discussion of this point in a representative agent framework.
4this setting too: the optimal monetary policy that emerges in this incomplete
markets economy is the same as in an analogue representative agent model.
However, that policy no longer calls for stabilizing the price level.
More generally, our results suggest that conclusions about optimal monetary
policy in representative agent models are robust to the market structure in the
following sense. If one posits shocks to the preference discount rate and allows
them to be correlated with aggregate shocks then the optimal policies can also
be construed as being the optimal policies that emerge in a particular model of
incomplete markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
heterogeneous-agents economy, and then construct a corresponding representative-
agent economy which yields the same equilibrium as the original economy. In
Section 3, we present our numerical results. In Section 4, we conclude.
2 The model economy
In this section we describe our model. It is a cashless New Keynesian economy
(see Woodford (2003) or Gal  (2008)) with nominal price rigidities as in Calvo
(1983) and uninsurable idiosyncratic individual risk.
2.1 Individuals
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals of unit measure, in-
dexed by i 2 [0;1]. They are subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
We assume that idiosyncratic shocks are independent across individuals, and a
law of large numbers applies.
Individuals consume and invest a composite good, which is produced by a
continuum of dierentiated products, indexed by j 2 [0;1]. If the supply of each
variety is given by Yj;t, for j 2 [0;1], the aggregate amount of the composite












where  > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across dierent varieties. This
composite good is used for consumption and investment:
Yt = Ct + It
where Ct and It denote the aggregate amounts of consumption and investment
in period t, respectively. Let Pj;t denote the price of variety j in period t. It


















Preferences of each individual are described by the utility function dened











where  is a subjective discount factor, ci;t is individual i's consumption of the
composite good in period t, and li;t is her labor supply in period t. We use Ei
t
to denote the expectation operator conditional on the history of idiosyncratic
shocks to individual i up to and including period t as well as the history of ag-
gregate shocks over the same time period. The expectation operator conditional
on the history of aggregate shocks up to and including period t is denoted by
Et. It will prove convenient to dene c as
c  1   (1   ) (5)
Then, 1=c is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption with
a constant level of leisure.
The idiosyncratic risk faced by individual i is represented by a geometric
random walk fi;tg:





where ;i;t is N(0;1) and i.i.d. across individuals and over time. The standard
deviation, ;t, is allowed to uctuate over time, in a way that will be specied
below. The process fi;tg aects individual i's income in two ways. First, i;t
aects the productivity of individual i's labor (her eciency units of labor).
Thus, if wt is the real wage rate per eciency unit of labor, the labor income
of individual i in period t is given by wti;tli;t. Second, i;t aects the return
on savings.
We will abstract from government bonds. Suppose that claims to the owner-
ship of physical capital and the ownership of rms are traded separately. Let qj;t
be the period-t price of a share in rm j 2 [0;1], and ei;j;t be the share in rm j
held by individual i at the end of period t. Below we conjecture an equilibrium
in which all individuals choose the same portfolio weights, and hence they hold
equal shares of all rms, that is, ei;j;t = ei;t for all j 2 [0;1]. We then verify that
such an equilibrium exists. Let si;t be the value of stocks held by individual i:
si;t 
R 1
0 qj;tei;j;t dj = ei;t
R 1
0 qj;t dj, and let Rs;t be the gross rate of return on
equities: Rs;t 
R 1
0 (qj;t + dj;t)dj=
R 1
0 qj;t 1 dj.
6Under our assumption that the return to savings is also subject to idiosyn-
cratic risk, the ow budget constraint becomes
ci;t + ki;t + si;t =
i;t
i;t 1
(Rk;tki;t 1 + Rs;tsi;t 1) + i;twtli;t (7)
Here ki;t is the amount of physical capital obtained by individual i in period t,
and Rk;t is the gross rate of return on physical capital, that is,
Rk;t = 1    + rk;t (8)
where rk;t is the rental rate of capital and  is its depreciation rate. To rule out
Ponzi schemes, we impose ki;t  0 and si;t  0. These last two constraints will
not bind in equilibrium.8
In equation (7), i;t=i;t 1 is an idiosyncratic shock to the return on savings.
Under this assumption \permanent income" of individual i, which is dened as
the sum of human and nancial wealth, is proportional to i;t.
The assumption that the idiosyncratic risk to labor and capital income is
perfectly correlated is strong but it buys us a lot. Under this assumption we are
able to derive a tractable solution to what, is in general, a challenging model
to solve and analyze. This assumption also strikes us as empirically relevant.
As we noted in the introduction home ownership creates a positive correlation
between labor risk and nancial risk. Labor and nancial risks are also likely
to be positively correlated for privately held rms as in Angeletos (2007).
At date 0, each individual chooses a contingent plan fci;t;li;t;ki;t;si;tg so as
to maximize her utility (4) given fki; 1;si; 1;i; 1g and subject to the sequence
of ow budget constraints (7) and the short-selling constraint on fki;t;si;tg.9
















(Rk;tki;t 1 + Rs;tsi;t 1) + i;twtli;t   ci;t   ki;t   si;t
)
Then the rst-order conditions are
c
 c
















8Constantinides and Due (1996) show that in equilibrium agents never choose to borrow.
Our economy has this same property.
9Note that we are allowing for ex ante heterogeneity.
7and the ow budget constraint (7). The transversality conditions for ki;t and








0ti;tsi;t = 0 (14)
Given a vector stochastic process fRk;t;Rs;t;wtg, a solution to the utility
maximization problem of each individual is a state-contingent plan fci;t;li;t;ki;t,
si;t;i;tg that satises the rst-order conditions (7)-(12), as well as the transver-
sality conditions (13)-(14) and the initial conditions.
2.2 Aggregation
Here we show that the utility maximization problem of the heterogeneous agents
under incomplete markets described in Section 2.1 can be aggregated into a
utility maximization problem of a representative agent. The key insight in our
aggregation result is to recognize that the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic
risk induces stochastic shocks to the utility function of the representative agent
as in Nakajima (2005).










t (1   Lt)1 1 
(15)
where Ct is the amount of consumption of the composite good dened in (1)
in period t, and L is the amount of labor supply in period t. Here, t is the












where c is dened in (5), and ;t is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic








where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on the history of aggre-
gate shocks up to and including period t.
Suppose that the representative agent faces the following ow budget con-
straint:
Ct + Kt + St = Rk;tKt 1 + Rs;tSt 1 + wtLt (17)
and initial conditions K 1;S 1 > 0. Here Kt and St are the amount of physical
capital and the value of stocks held by the representative agent in period t. We
8assume the short-selling constraints: Kt;St  0. These two constraints do not
bind in equilibrium. Given prices and the initial condition, the representative
agent chooses a contingent plan fCt;Lt;Kt;Stg so as to maximize lifetime utility
U0 in (15) subject to the sequence of ow budget constraints (17) and short-
selling constraints.










t (1   Lt)1 1 
+ t [Rk;tKt 1 + Rs;tSt 1 + wtLt   Ct   Kt   St]

and the rst-order conditions are given by
C
 c














along with the ow budget constraint (17). The transversality condition for Kt
and St are, respectively,
E0tttKt = 0 (22)
E0tttSt = 0 (23)
Given the initial conditions K 1 and S 1, a solution to the utility maximization
problem of the representative agent is given by fCt;Lt;Kt;St;tg that satises
the rst-order conditions (17)-(21), as well as the transversality conditions (22)-
(23).
The next proposition establishes that the solution to the utility maximization
problem of the representative agent, and the solution to the utility maximization
problem of each individual described in Section 2.1 are the same.
Proposition 1. Given stochastic processes fRk;t;Rs;t;wt;;tg and initial con-
ditions fK 1;S 1g, consider the utility maximization problem of individual i
described in Section 2.1 and the utility maximization problem of the represen-







solution to the representative agent's problem. For each i 2 [0;1], suppose that
the initial conditions have the following form:
R 1
0 i; 1 = 1, ki; 1 = i; 1K 1



















t=0 is a solution to the problem
of individual i.
9Proof. Take stochastic processes fRk;t;Rs;t;wt;;tg and initial conditions fK 1,






t=0 is a solution to the rep-
resentative agent's problem. Then it satises the rst-order conditions, (17)-














is straightforward to see that these satisfy the rst-order conditions, (7), (9)-
(12), and the transversality conditions, (13)-(14), for the problem of individual
i. This completes the proof.
Proposition 1 applies in a setting where agents are ex ante homogeneous
i; 1 =  1. But it also applies in situations where there are ex ante dierences
among individuals. This second setting will be of interest when we consider the
optimal monetary policy problem below.
Proposition 1 also has a number of important implications. First, individual
labor allocations are identical across all agents. Note also that ci;t=i; 1 is i.i.d.
across agents in all periods as in e.g. Constantinides and Due (1996), Krebs
(2003), and Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2008). It follows from these
two properties that, in equilibrium, the utility function of the representative
agent (15) is proportionate to the cross-sectional average of individual utility


























































Second, by appealing to Proposition 1, it is possible to see in a very transpar-
ent way how the size of idiosyncratic shocks, ;t, aect the aggregate dynamics
of the economy. Let us dene the \eective discount factor" between periods t
and t + 1, ~ t;t+1, as











where the second equality follows from (16). This expression illustrates that
the presence of idiosyncratic shocks (;t > 0) makes the eective discount
factor higher if c > 1 and lower if c < 1. These results are associated with
relative prudence, which is 1 + c here. As is well known, if relative prudence
is greater (less) than 2 the demand for a risky asset will increase (decrease)
with the risk of the asset (see e.g. Gollier (2001)). This eect is reected here
in the relationship between the eective discount factor ~ t;t+1 and the size of
10the idiosyncratic risk 2
;t+1 in (25). Note also that cyclical uctuations in the
variance of idiosyncratic shocks, 2
;t, induce cyclical variations in the eective
discount factor ~ t;t+1.
Generally speaking, in incomplete markets economies agents have dierent
consumptions and thus price future cash ows in dierent ways.10 A third
implication of Proposition 1 though is that in our economy individuals agree on
the present value of future dividends of each rm. This is due to the fact that the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for each individual is independent of
the history of idiosyncratic shocks. To see this, note that the stochastic discount






















Since ;i;t+1 is i.i.d. across individuals and independent of the stochastic shocks
faced by each rm, all individuals value a given future payo in the same way.
In particular, we can use the stochastic discount factor of the representative
agent, t+1t+1=(tt), to value future dividend streams of rms.
Finally, note that the fact that agents agree about the value of each rm
under the allocations described in Proposition 1 also implies that our initial
assumption that individuals hold equal shares of all rms, ei;j;t = ei;t for all
j 2 [0;1], is indeed consistent with utility maximization of each individual.11
2.3 Firms
The production side of our economy is standard in the New Keynesian liter-
ature and similar to the one considered by Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007).
Each dierentiated product is produced by a single rm in a monopolistically






j;t   t (26)
where zt is the aggregate productivity shock, Kj;t is the physical capital used by
rm j in period t, Lj;t is its labor input, and t is the xed cost of production.
The market clearing conditions for capital and labor are
Z 1
0
Kj;t dj = Kt 1; and
Z 1
0
Lj;t dj = Lt
Here, note that the stock of capital available for production in period t is Kt 1.
The processes for zt and t are specied in Section 2.3.
10See e.g. Magill and Quinzii (1996) for a discussion on this point.
11We do not pursue this here but in principle there could be other equilibria in which
portfolios dier across individuals.
11Consider the cost minimization problem of rm j:
min
Kj;t;Lj;t





j;t   t = Yj;t
Since, all rms choose the same capital labor ratio, the rst-order conditions of
their cost-minimization problems are identical













where mct is marginal cost which is given by:






The price of each variety is adjusted in a sluggish way as in Calvo (1983)
and Yun (1996). For each rm, the opportunity to change the price of its
product arrives with probability 1  in each period. This random event occurs
independently across rms (it is also independent of all other stochastic shocks
in our economy). Without such an opportunity, a rm must charge the same
price as in the previous period. Suppose that rm j obtains an opportunity to





















where st+st+s=(tt) is the stochastic discount factor used to evaluate (real)
payos in period t + s in units of consumption in period t.
All rms with the opportunity to change their prices will choose the same
price, so denote it by ~ Pt. Then the rst-order condition for the above prot-































































It is convenient to express x1
t and x2
t in a recursive fashion:
x1













Since all rms that adjust their prices in a given period choose the same new





t 1 + (1   ) ~ P
1 
t
which can be rewritten as
1 = 
 1+
t + (1   )~ p
1 
t (32)
To derive the aggregate production function, rewrite the production function



















t   t (33)









The evolution of &t can be written as





The aggregate consumption, investment and capital stock satisfy
Yt = Ct + It (35)
Kt = It + (1   )Kt 1 (36)
132.4 Aggregate shocks
We consider two specications of the aggregate productivity shock. One speci-
cation we consider is a permanent productivity shock. In particular, we assume
that zt follows a geometric random walk:





and the xed cost of production, t, grows at the rate :
t = exp(t) (38)
where  and z are constant parameters, and z;t is N(0;1) and i.i.d. across
periods. The other specication we consider is a temporary but persistent pro-
ductivity shock. We assume that zt follows an AR(1) process:





and that the xed cost is constant:
t =  (40)
For both specications, the constant  is calibrated so that the aggregate prot
is zero in the non-stochastic steady state (balanced growth path) with zero
ination.
The standard deviation of innovations to individual labor productivity, ;t,
is also an aggregate shock. It acts like a preference discount rate shock to
the representative agent. Evidence provided by Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron
(2004) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) suggests that idiosyncratic risk is coun-
tercyclical. Krebs (2003) and De Santis (2007) have found that the welfare cost
of business cycles can be sizable with countercyclical idiosyncratic risk. The
only other aggregate shock in our economy is a shock to the aggregate state of
technology. If we allow for a negative correlation between ;t and the aggregate
technology shock, idiosyncratic risk will be countercyclical.12 Specically, when
the evolution of the aggregate productivity is given by (37), we assume that the
variance of idiosyncratic shocks evolves as
2
;t =  2
 + bzz;t (41)
and when zt follows the temporary process given by (39), we assume that
2
;t =  2
 + blnzt (42)
12We are not asserting anything here about the direction of causality. We are following the
literature we cited above and abstracting from a formal model that links idiosyncratic risk to
the level of aggregate technology. But we can imagine situations in which the causality goes
in either direction.
14An important dierence between the two specications of technology shocks
is that 2
;t is serially correlated in (42) but not in (41). By combining equation
(41) or alternatively (42) with equation (25) one can show that the eective
preference discount factor inherits these properties. Under the specication
with permanent shocks it is given by:
ln ~ t;t+1 = ln +
1
2
c(c   1)( 2
 + bzz;t+1) (43)
And under the assumption of temporary but persistent shocks it is
ln ~ t;t+1 = ln +
1
2
c(c   1)( 2
 + blnzt+1) (44)
From these two equations we can see that the law of motion of the eective
discount factor for the representative agent has an explicit link to the law of mo-
tion of the variance of idiosyncratic shocks faced by individuals. Discount factor
shocks have been found to be an important source of business cycle variation
in the New Keynesian models of Smets and Wouters (2003), Levin, Onatski,
Williams and Williams (2005), and Burriel, Fern andez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ram rez (2010) among others. Our model raises the interesting possibility that
the discount factor shocks estimated in these papers reect, at least partially,
variation in the individual risk environment. We will display some parameteri-
zations of the model below in which time-varying individual risk is a signicant
source of business cycle uctuations even when the state of technology is held
constant.
2.5 Monetary policy
Government policy is very simple in our economy. First, we abstract from scal
policy: the government does not consume, and there are no government bonds
or taxes. Second, we assume that the monetary authority can directly control
the ination rate. Thus, monetary policy is specied as a state contingent path
of the ination rate, ftg1
t=0.
2.6 Denition of equilibrium
The denition of equilibrium for the economy proceeds in two steps. First we
dene an equilibrium for the representative agent economy. That equilibrium
determines aggregate allocations and prices. Then in a second step we show
how to derive the individual allocations.
Denition 1. A representative agent equilibrium consists of a set of stochas-
tic processes for fCt;Lt;Kt;It;Yt;St;t;mct;wt;rt;Rs;t;Rk;t;x1
t;x2
t; ~ pt;&tg that
satisfy equations (8), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31),
(32), (33), (34), (35), and (36) and the transversality conditions (22) and (23)
for given fK 1;& 1g, laws of motion for the exogenous shocks and monetary
policy, ftg1
t=0.
15The aggregate allocations from the representative agent equilibrium can be
used to derive the individual allocations in the following way. Under the as-
sumption of Proposition 1, the initial wealth distribution is given by: ki; 1 =
i; 1K 1 and si; 1 = i; 1S 1. Then Proposition 1 implies that the individual
allocations for t = 0;1;2;::: are given by ci;t = i;tCt, li;t = Lt, ki;t = i;tKt,
si;t = i;tSt, and i;t = 
 c
i;t t.
2.7 Optimal monetary policy
We consider optimal \Ramsey" monetary policies, where a benevolent monetary
authority pre-commits to a state-contingent path of the ination rate so as to
maximize a weighted average of utility of individuals subject to the restriction
that the resulting allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium. In
the discussion that follows we will explicitly rule out policies such as agent-
specic lump-sum transfers or labor or capital taxation. All of these policies
fall in the realm of scal policy.
Let i denote the Pareto weights which are assumed to be positive 8i and
satisfy
R
i idi = 1. Then the objective function for a benevolent monetary
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di
Generally speaking, the Ramsey planner chooses individual allocations and it
is necessary to impose all of the competitive equilibrium restrictions simultane-
ously. However, the competitive allocations in our economy have two properties
that allow us to also factor the objective function into two parts. First, in equi-
librium all individuals make identical labor supply decisions, li;t = Lt. Second,
ci;t
i; 1 is i.i.d. across individuals in all periods. Both of these properties follow
from Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. For all choices of i that satisfy i > 0;8i and
R
i idi = 1 the
objective function for the Ramsey planner's problem is U0 in (15).












































Observe that the term in parenthesis in the nal line is a constant that is
independent of policy.
16From the proof we can see that individuals are both ex ante and ex post
dierent. For our Ramsey planner, who must honor the restrictions of an in-
complete markets equilibrium, these dierences get reected in the constant
term. All agents face the same distribution of future consumption growth at all
points of time and are proportional to each other. Thus, any manipulation of
the price system will aect all agents in the same way. It follows that there is
no opportunity for the monetary authority to aect equity in this incomplete
markets economy.
Proposition 2 makes it possible to solve for the optimal monetary policy using
the same two step procedure that we used to solve the competitive equilibrium.
First, we solve a representative agent Ramsey problem. Then in a second step
we derive the individual allocations.
Denition 2. The representative agent Ramsey problem is to maximize U0
in (15) by choice of the ination rate ftg subject to (8), (17), (18), (19),
(20), (21), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), (33), (34), (35), and (36) and
the transversality conditions (22) and (23) for given fK 1;& 1g, and laws of
motion for the exogenous shocks.
Note that conditional on a choice of ftg, the remaining equilibrium prices
and aggregate quantities are indirectly determined via the constraints. Then
the individual allocations can be derived using the same strategy described in
the denition of equilibrium above. There is a well known time consistency issue
in this class of problem. In the numerical analysis that follows we consider the
optimal policy from the timeless perspective as proposed by Woodford (2003).
3 Results
In this section we analyze how the presence of idiosyncratic shocks aects the
properties of the optimal monetary policy. We are particularly interested in the
case where the idiosyncratic risk, ;t, uctuates countercyclically. We show
that even though countercyclical idiosyncratic risk makes the welfare cost of
business cycles sizable, properties of the optimal monetary policy are little af-
fected by the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. Namely, the optimal monetary
policy is roughly characterized as the zero-ination policy.
3.1 Analytic results
Let us rst consider the case where scal policy eliminates the monopoly distor-
tion at the zero-ination steady state as in Woodford (2003) and Gal  (2008).
Specically, suppose that each monopolist's revenue is subsidized at a rate ,
that the subsidies are nanced by lump-sum taxes, Tt, on monopolists, and





Yj;t   wtLj;t   rtKj;t   Tt
17where Tt = 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then the monopoly distortion is eliminated at the zero-ination steady state.
Let the stochastic processes for fztg and f2
;tg be given either by (37) and
(41), or by (39) and (42), respectively.
Now consider our model with heterogeneous agents under incomplete mar-
kets. Market incompleteness introduces a new distortion and thus, in principle,
the possibility that there might be a trade o for monetary policy between cor-
recting this distortion and the distortions that arise from costly price adjustment
and imperfect competition. However, from Proposition 1 we know that our in-
complete markets economy has a representative agent representation in which
there are shocks to technology and preferences. It then follows using exactly
the same reasoning as Woodford (2003) and Gal  (2008) that price stabilization
is the optimal monetary policy.
Proposition 3. Assume that subsidies to the monopolists are given at the rate
 = 1=   1, which are nanced by lump-sum taxes on the monopolists. Suppose
also that the economy is initially at the zero-ination steady state. Then the
solution to the Ramsey problem is given by
t = 1;
at all dates, under all contingencies and for all Pareto weights.
3.2 Quantitative results
Now let us now consider the case with no subsidy:  = Tt = 0. With the
monopoly distortion, setting the ination rate to zero at all dates is no longer
optimal. The main question asked in this subsection is how dierent the optimal
monetary policy is from the zero-ination policy. The answer to this question
is not immediately obvious. On the one hand, the results we have describe
above show that there are no opportunities for an optimal monetary policy
to aect equity. However, the same opportunities to enhance eciency that
arise in representative agent models are also present here. Moreover, there is
an important dierence between our representative agent specication and that
considered by e.g. Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007). The eective preference
discount factor is correlated with the technology shock and the nature of this
dependence varies with the value of c and the law of motion of idiosyncratic
risk. It turns out that this distinction can have a rst order impact on the welfare
cost of business cycles when the variance of idiosyncratic risk is countercyclical.
This result occurs when we use an individual's utility function to assess the
welfare. From equation (24) we can see that this result also applies when we
use the utility function of the representative agent to evaluate welfare.
18The parameter values of our model are calibrated as follows. One period in
the model corresponds to a quarter. The share of capital is  = 0:36, and the
depreciation rate is  = 0:02. These are taken from Boldrin, Christiano and
Fisher (2001). The probability of price adjustment is set to 0.2, i.e.,  = 0:8
and the elasticity of substitution across dierent varieties of products is  = 5,
following Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007). The xed cost of production,  ,
is set so that the prot of each rm at the non-stochastic steady state under
optimal monetary policy is zero. The discount factor  is chosen so that the
real interest rate at the non-stochastic steady state is four percent a year. For
the preference parameter, we consider two values for c, 0.7 and 2. For each
value of c, another preference parameter  is set so that the labor supply at the
stochastic steady state is one third (then,  is determined as  = 1 (1 c)=).
For the case of permanent productivity shock (37), we follow Boldrin, Christiano
and Fisher (2001) and set  = 0:004, and z = 0:018. For the case of a
temporary productivity shock (39), we follow Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007)13
and set z = 0:8556 and z = 0:0064=(1   ). For the idiosyncratic shock
process, we follow De Santis (2007) and set   = 0:1=2 and b = 0 or b =  0:8.
It turns out that as long as we adjust  so as to keep the steady state interest
rate xed (i.e., four percent a year), the value of  does not matter. When
b = 0, the idiosyncratic risk is acyclical; when b =  0:8, it is countercyclical. De
Santis (2007) chooses b =  0:8 based on the evidence provided by Storesletten,
Telmer and Yaron (2004).
In what follows, we compare dynamics of dierent versions of our model
economy, which dier in terms of the risk aversion parameter, c 2 f0:7;2g;
the cyclicality of the idiosyncratic risk, b 2 f0; 0:8g; the persistence of the
aggregate productivity shock, (37) and (39); or the monetary policy: Ramsey
and zero ination-targeting. In addition, for each value of c and b, and for each
process for zt, we compute two normative measures of welfare costs.
The rst one is the welfare cost of business cycles as originally estimated
by Lucas (1987). Specically, we consider the real-business-cycle version of our
model, in which there are no nominal rigidities, and compare the economy with
positive aggregate shocks, z > 0, and the economy without aggregate shocks,
z = 0. In both cases we assume that there are idiosyncratic shocks,   > 0.
We also assume that both economies are at the non-stochastic steady state prior
to date 0 and compare the welfare conditional on the state vector at t =  1.14
Let Xt denote the vector of the state variables, and let  X denote its value at
the non-stochastic steady state. Further, let fCrbc
t ;Lrbc
t g denote the equilibrium
process of aggregate consumption and labor supply in the RBC version of our
economy, and let f  C;  Lg denote their values in the steady state. Then, dene
13Note that the productivity level zt in Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007) corresponds to our
z1 
t , so that their standard deviation must be adjusted by 1=(1   ).
14In this sense, we are measuring conditional welfare costs. Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007)
discuss a related issue.
19lifetime utility evaluated at period t =  1 by
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where t is given by (16). The corresponding value for the non-stochastic econ-
omy is given by
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where  t is dened by
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((1   bc)  C)(1    L)1 1 
= V (  X;z;rbc)
that is,
bc = 1  

V (  X;z;rbc)
V (  X;0;rbc)
 1
1 c
The second welfare cost measure is the cost of adopting a non-optimal policy
(the zero ination-targeting policy) as opposed to the optimal monetary policy
(the Ramsey policy). Somewhat abusing notation, we again use  X to denote
the non-stochastic steady state under the Ramsey policy. It turns out that the
steady-state ination rate under the Ramsey policy is zero. Therefore,  X is also
the non-stochastic steady state associated with the ination-targeting policy.
Suppose that the economy is at the steady state  X prior to date 0. Then the
welfare cost of the ination-targeting policy, inf, is given as
inf = 1  

V (  X;z;inf)
V (  X;z;ram)
 1
1 c
where V (  X;z;inf) and V (  X;z;ram) are the lifetime utility associated with
the ination-targeting and Ramsey monetary policies, respectively.
3.2.1 The specication with permanent productivity shocks
Table 1 reports the welfare cost of business cycles, bc, for c = 0:7;2 and
for b = 0; 0:8. When risk aversion is relatively low, c = 0:7, the welfare
cost of business cycles is negative. That is, expected utility is higher when
z > 0 than when z = 0. Furthermore, in this case, making the idiosyncratic
20risk countercyclical decreases the welfare cost of business cycles. That is, it
increases the welfare gain of business cycles.
These results are similar in nature to a previous nding by Cho and Cooley
(2005). They show that a mean-preserving increase of the variance of technology
shocks can improve welfare. To see why, remember that the indirect utility
function of a consumer is quasi-convex in prices, and note that technology shocks
create uctuations in the wage rate, i.e., the price of leisure. Of course, the quasi-
convexity of the indirect utility function is a partial-equilibrium property. But
if this eect is strong enough, increasing the variance of the technology shock
makes it possible for agents to concentrate their work eort in periods where
their labor productivity is highest, which increases welfare.
On the other hand, when the relative risk aversion is higher, c = 2, the
welfare cost of business cycles is positive. Cyclical uctuations in ;t act to
increase the welfare costs of business cycles. When c = 2 and b =  0:8, the
welfare cost of business cycles is about 7.3% of consumption, which is a sizable
amount.
Table 1 also reports the welfare cost of adopting a strict zero ination-
targeting policy. Observe that the welfare cost of adopting the ination-targeting
policy is negligible for all values of c and b. Even when c = 2 and b =  0:8, it
is only 0.0006 percent. For purposes of comparison the welfare cost of business
cycles is 7.3% for that case. In this sense, under permanent productivity shocks,
cyclical uctuations in the idiosyncratic risk do not change the nature of the
optimal monetary policy even when the welfare cost of business cycles is large.
3.2.2 The specication with temporary productivity shocks
Now consider the case where productivity shocks are temporary but persistent.
Then the process for zt is given by (39), and the variance of idiosyncratic shocks
follows the process given by (42). This specication diers from the specication
in Section 3.2.1 in two important ways. First, the productivity process (39) is
stationary. Second, since lnzt is autocorrelated, so is ;t. This introduces
predictable variability in idiosyncratic risk, and thus, to the eective discount
factor, which was i.i.d. in Section 3.2.1.
Specically, the eective discount factor is now given by




Its conditional expectation then becomes










which uctuates over time. Indeed, when c < 1 and b < 0, the productivity
shock today increases zt as well as the expected value of the eective discount
factor, Et[ln ~ t;t+1]. On the other hand, when c > 1 and b < 0, the shock
increasing zt decreases Et[ln ~ t;t+1].
21Table 2 shows the welfare costs of business cycles, bc, for c = 0:7;2 and for
b = 0; 0:8. As opposed to the case of permanent shocks in Section 3.2.1, when
b = 0, bc is negative for the both values of c. In addition, its absolute value
is much smaller. As in the permanent-shock case, countercyclical idiosyncratic
risk increases the welfare gain of business cycles for c = 0:7, and increases the
welfare cost of business cycles when c = 2.
When c = 2 and b =  0:8, the welfare cost of business cycles is sizable
(12.2%), even though the productivity process is stationary. Note that the
welfare costs of business cycles for this specication are about 5 percent larger
than the case with permanent technology shocks. To see why the welfare costs
are larger here consider a temporary negative shock to technology. If we abstract
from variations in the preference discount factor the welfare costs of business
cycles would be smaller in the presence of persistent but stationary technology
shocks as compared to the case of permanent technology shocks. However, when
technology shocks are stationary and persistent a negative technology shock
has a second eect. It also increases the eective preference discount factor
in a persistent way (see (44)). This second eect increases individuals' saving
motives in a bad state and this acts to exacerbate consumption variations.
The welfare costs of price stabilization continue to be small when technology
shocks are stationary. Comparing Table 2 with Table 1 we see that the welfare
costs are larger when risk aversion is 2 and idiosyncratic risk is countercyclical.
This is due to the persistent response of the eective discount factor. However,
the size of the welfare cost of price stabilization is still quite small (0.0024%).
To summarize, with countercyclical idiosyncratic shocks, the welfare cost
of business cycles can be sizable. However, this does not aect how monetary
policy should be conducted. The optimal monetary policy is essentially a policy
that stabilizes the ination rate at zero.
3.2.3 The individual eects of cyclical variation in technology and
variation in idiosyncratic risk
We have seen in Tables 1 and 2 that variation in technology and variation in
idiosyncratic risk play distinct roles in our results and these roles vary with the
persistence of the shocks to the eective discount factor. To further explore the
eects of these two shocks consider Table 3 which reports results for a scenario
where the eective discount factor is assumed to follow (43) or alternatively (44)
but where variation in z;t or zt are not allowed to aect the state of technol-
ogy. In terms of the original incomplete-markets economy, we are considering a
situation where the variance of idiosyncratic risk uctuates over time, but the
aggregate state of technology is constant.
The rst column of Table 3 reports results for the specication where the
eective discount factor is given by (43) and thus i.i.d. Under this assump-
tion cyclical variation in idiosyncratic risk produces negligible costs of business
cycles. The costs of pursuing strict ination targeting are also tiny. This is
quite striking because from Table 1 we know that the combination of variation
in technology and countercyclical variation in risk produces large costs of busi-
22ness cycles as compared to the case where there is only variation in technology.
Thus, in this case, we need both shocks to generate a sizable cost of business
cycles. To see this, note that the specication (43) implies that the inequality
shock z;t only aects ~ t 1;t, the eective discount factor between t   1 and
t. Future discount factors, ~ s;s+1 for s  t, are not aected. Since z;t does
not aect technology in this experiment, it does not have a rst-order eect on
individuals' choices made in period t. That is, in this case, the cost of business
cycles is small because business cycles generated by fz;tg are very small.
Consider now the case where the eective discount factor follows (44) and is
thus persistent. For this specication cyclical variation in idiosyncratic risk is
very important. Now the costs of business cycles are quite large. They are 11%
when there is only cyclical variation in the eective discount factor as compared
to 12 percent when there is also variation in the state of technology. Thus,
in this specication, uctuations in the state of technology are not essential to
produce the sizable cost of business cycles. In addition, the welfare costs of
ination-targeting actually increase. However, the overall size of the costs of
ination targeting continue to be very small (0.0075%).
In terms of the cost of business cycles, what distinguishes the two cases in
Table 3 is whether or not the eective discount factor is serially correlated.
Consider (44) in which zt is serially correlated. In this case the eective dis-
count factor is also serially correlated. In particular, when c > 1, an increase
in inequality in period t (i.e., an increase in zt) raises both ~ t 1;t and the ex-
pected value of ~ t;t+1. The rise in the expected value of ~ t;t+1 tends to reduce
consumption today, Ct, and thus lowers the period-t utility ow. On the other
hand, the increase in ~ t 1;t increases the weight on the period-t utility ow in
the lifetime utility evaluation. Thus, a rise in inequality in period t lowers the
current utility ow and, at the same time, increases its weight in the lifetime
utility, which tends to make a recession a more miserable event. This is why
we have a sizable cost of business cycles in this case even though the aggre-
gate productivity is made constant. We can see that the serial correlation in
the eective discount factor is crucial in this argument. Without it, a rise in
inequality in period t would not cause a decline in Ct.
4 Conclusion
We conclude by briey discussing the robustness of our results to some of our
modeling assumptions. We have limited attention to technology shocks. Gal 
and Rabanal (2004) provide empirical evidence that suggests that technology
shocks are not an important source of business cycle uctuations. It is straight-
forward to extend the model to allow for other aggregate shocks to the markup,
and/or government purchases. If these shocks interact with the variance of
idiosyncratic risk, they will also get reected in the law of motion for the rep-
resentative agent's eective discount factor.
In this paper we have focused on sticky prices. With sticky wages, however,
stabilizing the price level ceases to be optimal even in the representative agent
23framework. In the Appendix we extend our basic model to incorporate sticky
wages show that our aggregation result still holds. There, the optimal monetary
policy no longer takes the form of price-level stabilization, but the optimal
monetary policy for the incomplete markets economy is still identical to the
optimal monetary policy in the corresponding representative agent economy
with preference shocks.
We have also assumed that the shock to labor and capital income is per-
fectly correlated. Reducing this correlation from one enhances the ability of
individuals to self insure against either type of risk and thus reduces the need
for implicit insurance. However, at the same time, when this correlation is re-
duced government policy has dierential eects on individuals. This opens up
the possibility for government policy to provide insurance by manipulating the
price system.
Finally, we have followed the convention in the New Keynesian literature and
abstracted from modeling the demand for money. This abstraction facilitates
the derivation of our aggregation result. However, it also rules out a channel for
monetary policy to aect household decisions. Ination is not a tax that aects
labor supply in the cashless New Keynesian economy.
Appendix: Adding sticky wages
In this Appendix we consider a New Keynesian model with both sticky prices
and sticky wages and derive an aggregation result similar to the one described in
the paper. The particular setup we consider generalizes the sticky-wage model
of Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2005) to allow for heterogeneous agents.
Following the literature, sticky wages are introduced here by assuming that
each individual supplies a continuum of dierentiated labor services j 2 [0;1],
and that the wage rate applied to each type of labor services is set by the \labor
union." With sticky wages, labor supply will vary across j. In the benchmark
model considered in the paper all individuals supply the same amount of labor
in each period. This property of the individual's decision problem plays an
important role in delivering our aggregation result. The same is true here: labor
supply may vary across the type of labor services, but not across individuals.
To meet this requirement, we assume that the union requires all individuals to
supply equal amounts of type j labor services.
Suppose that preferences of each individual are specied in the same way as
















24where li;t(j) is the amount of type-j labor supplied by individual i. As in the
benchmark model, individuals dier in terms of their labor productivity, i;t.
In terms of eciency units, the supply of type-j labor of individual i in period
t is i;tli;t(j) for all j 2 [0;1].
The production technology and the model of price adjustment of each rm
is the same as in the benchmark model but we now assume that rms use a
composite labor input made from dierentiated labor services. Assume that the

















where ~  is the elasticity of substitution across dierent labor services, and





In the above expression li;n;t(j) denotes the amount of type-j labor supplied by
individual i to rm n in period t.
The nominal wage rate of type-j labor is given by Wt(j), and wt(j) 






















In each period, wage rates and hours worked are determined by the labor
union, as in Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2005), among others. The nominal wage
rate of each type of labor, Wt(j), is set by the union in the Calvo way. In each
period, each nominal wage rate is adjusted with probability (1   ~ ). If Wt(j)
is not adjusted in period t, then it is equal to its value in the previous period,
i.e., Wt(j) = Wt 1(j). In each labor market j, the union takes Ht and Wt as
25exogenous. Given the wage rates, Wt(j), the union next sets hours worked for
each individual so as to satisfy the demands for each type of labor. We assume
that the union allocates hours worked equally across individuals, that is,
li;t(j) = Lt(j); for all i 2 [0;1].




Hn;t(j)dn = Lt(j); for each i 2 [0;1].








It follows that the utility maximization problem for each individual is the
same as in the benchmark model except that he/she no longer chooses hours
worked by himself/herself. As in the benchmark model, the initial condition
for each individual is assumed to satisfy ki; 1 = i; 1K 1 and si; 1 = i; 1S 1
with
R 1
0 i; 1 di = 1. Let fLt(j) : j 2 [0;1]g1
t=0 denote the supply of type-j labor
assigned by the union. Then, given prices, and the assigned hours worked, each





ci;t + ki;t + si;t =
i;t
i;t 1




with ki;t;si;t  0 for all t.
An aggregation result similar to Proposition 1 holds for the individual utility
maximization problems. As in the benchmark model, consider a representative
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Given prices and assigned hours worked for each type of labor, fLt(j) : j 2
[0;1]g, the representative agent chooses a contingent plan fCt;Kt;Stg so as to
maximize utility (50) subject to the sequence of ow budget constraints:




26and Kt;St  0 with the initial condition K 1;S 1 > 0. Now suppose that
fCt;Kt;Stg is the solution to the representative agent's utility maximization
problem. And for each i 2 [0;1], let ci;t = i;tCt, ki;t = i;tKt, and si;t =
i;tSt. Then it is straightforward to show that the allocation fci;t;ki;t;si;tg
constructed in this fashion is the solution to the utility maximization problem
for each individual i. In addition, U0 is proportional to the cross-sectional
average of
R 1
0 ui;0 di so that maximizing U0 indeed maximizes average utility of
all individuals.
Given this aggregation result, the utility maximization problem with sticky
wages can be formulated in exactly the same way as the corresponding problem
with a representative household in Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2005). Consider




subject to the ow budget constraints (51), short-selling constraints, the labor
demand condition (49), and the Calvo-type restriction on wage adjustments:
wt(j) =
(
~ wt; with probability 1   ~ ;
wt 1(j)
t ; with probability ~ t,
where t  Pt=Pt 1 is the gross ination rate in period t. Here, ~ wt denotes the
real wage rate in period t chosen for those types of labor for which the union
has the opportunity to re-optimize.
The objective function of the monetary authority in this problem factors in
an analogous way to Proposition 2. It follows that incomplete markets is irrel-
evant in the following sense: the optimal monetary policy in our model with
uninsured risk is identical to optimal monetary policy in the corresponding rep-
resentative agent model. Price stabilization is no longer the optimal monetary
policy for the reasons emphasized in Gal  (2008).
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c 0.7 0.7 2 2
b 0 -0.8 0 -0.8
bc (%) -0.8191 -1.2983 2.0938 7.3301
inf (%) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006
Table 1: Welfare costs of business cycles (bc ) and price stabilization (inf)
with permanent technology shocks
.
c 0.7 0.7 2 2
b 0 -0.8 0 -0.8
bc (%) -0.0171 -0.6191 -0.0073 12.2258
inf (%) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0024
Table 2: Welfare costs of business cycles and price stabilization with temporary
technology shocks.
i.i.d. persistent
bc (%) 0.0061 11.0914
inf (%) 0.0000 0.0075
Table 3: Welfare measures when the state of technology is constant (c = 2
and b =  0:8). The column labeled \i.i.d." reports results for the case where
the eective discount factor is i.i.d and the column labeled \persistent" reports
results for the case where it is persistent.
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